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This paper investigates the effects of fixed versus flexible exchange rates on firms’
location choices and on countries’specialization patterns. In a two-country, two-
differentiated-goods monetary model, uncertainty arises after wages are set and
prices are optimally chosen. The paper shows that countries are more specialized
under flexible than fixed rates, which indicates that the pattern of specialization is
not uniquely defined by trade models but also depends on the exchange rate
regime. The creation of a currency area endogenously increases the desirability of
such an area by reducing the asymmetry of shocks across member countries. The
results also shed light on the effects of exchange rate variability on trade. [JEL F1,
F31, F33, F4, L16, R12]
I
n the presence of price rigidities, countries tend to be more specialized under flex-
ible exchange rates than under fixed exchange rates, thus suggesting that the pat-
tern of specialization indicated by any trade model is not unique but also depends
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on the exchange rate regime. An important implication follows: the net benefits
that can be expected from the creation of a currency area are endogenous to—and
rise with—the creation of the currency area, as the latter induces sectoral disper-
sion and consequently reduces the degree of asymmetry of shocks across candi-
date countries. A second implication is that an increase in exchange rate variability
would have an ambiguous effect on trade by increasing interindustry trade and
reducing intra-industry trade. The implications highlight some possible real effects
arising from the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU).
Both the main results and the implications of this paper adequately capture
some facts highlighted in the literature. The positive effect of flexible exchange
rates on trade specialization is consistent with Fontagné and Freudenberg (1999),
who find that exchange rate variability increases interindustry trade and reduces
intra-industry trade (thus raising specialization) among European Union (EU)
countries. The predicted positive impact of fixed exchange rates on the symmetry
of shock is consistent with the results of Fatás (1997), who shows that the busi-
ness cycle correlation of EU countries increased after the introduction of the
European Monetary System. The endogeneity of the desirability of a currency
union is consistent with Frankel and Rose (1998), who find that industrial coun-
tries that trade more with each other have more correlated business cycles; hence,
if the EMU enhances trade among its member countries, shocks should become
more symmetric.1 The ambiguous effect of exchange rate variability on trade is
highlighted in the empirical results of Clark and others (2004).
To illustrate, consider a world composed of two countries (1 and 2) engaging
in both intra- and interindustry trade of two differentiated goods (A and  B).
Assume country 1 is a net exporter of good A. After prices are chosen, consider a
shift of demand from good B to good A. Under fixed exchange rates, the shock
equally affects all firms producing the same good, regardless of their location.
Under floating, however, currency 1 appreciates, and the consequent substitution
effect reduces the initial increase of demand experienced by firms producing A in
country 1 and generates a further increase in the demand for varieties of A produced
in country 2 (the opposite holds true for industry B.)
This implies that, on average, endogenous exchange rate movements provide
a partial adjustment to shocks for firms located in the country that is a net exporter
of the good they produce but generate further disturbance for firms producing 
the same good in the net importer country. As a consequence, under a flexible
exchange rate regime, firms located in the country relatively specialized in (net
exporter of) the good they produce experience a lower variability in sales than
their competitors.
To the extent that firms dislike variability in sales, under flexible exchange
rates the uneven sectoral adjustment to shocks gives firms an incentive to locate in
the country that is relatively specialized in the good they produce. Under fixed
exchange rates, however, all firms face the same variability in sales regardless 
of their location, so this incentive does not arise. Thus, countries should be more
1See, however, Imbs (1999), who finds that neither the degree of trade intensity nor a fixed exchange
rate regime seems to matter for the synchronization of the business cycle.Luca Antonio Ricci
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specialized under flexible exchange rates than under fixed rates. This would sug-
gest that nominal rigidities and shocks could induce an additional incentive for
specialization, in addition to those suggested by trade and location theory.
The novelty of our results stems from the integration of basic elements of open
macroeconomic, trade, and location theory (i.e., price rigidities, specialization pat-
terns, and location choices), thus overcoming some limitations of each approach.
Open macroeconomics usually neglects countries’ specialization patterns.2 Trade
theory usually ignores the existence of short-run market rigidities and assigns no
role to the nominal exchange rate. Location theory normally does not consider the
effects of exchange rate regimes on the location choices of firms.3 While several
papers have analyzed the effects of exchange rate regimes on foreign direct invest-
ment(FDI),thisliterature (except for Aizenman, 1992) usually neglects the endoge-
nous nature of the exchange rate and fails to capture the heterogeneity of sectors of
production in the economy.4 Hence, it does not allow us to infer how changes in
FDI induced by exchange rate variability influence the pattern of specialization.
We develop a two-country, two-differentiated-good, one-factor monetary model
in which countries engage in both inter- and intraindustry trade. Price rigidities,
decreasing returns to scale, and international labor immobility allow us to tailor
the model toward the representation of the short-run adjustment to shocks. The
effectiveness of the exchange rate stems from the fact that countries do not have
an identical production structure and that wages are set and prices are optimally
chosen before the resolution of uncertainty. We ignore the existence of trade costs
to neutralize the backward and forward linkages, and thus focus on the location
incentives and specialization patterns induced by the sectoral impact of exchange
rate adjustments.5
I. The Model
The model extends Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) to a two-country two-
differentiated-good setup.6 This is similar to a one-period version of the new open
economy approach (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000), but with two tradable goods.
2See, however, Faruqee (1996), which introduces nominal rigidities in a two-country model of imperfect
competition and investigates the implications of different trade patterns for real exchange rate dynamics. Tille
(2006) builds on Ricci (1997a) and Faruqee (1996) to investigate how the differential impact of exchange rate
movements across sectors leads to substantial welfare differences across households in a given country.
3See, however, Ricci (1998) for agglomeration effects arising from exchange rate variability. For a
review of the location literature, see Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (1999). For a survey of location theory
in a historical perspective, see Fujita and Thisse (1996).
4Most of the investigations are based on a partial equilibrium analysis of the behavior of a single firm
and find that when the variability of the exchange rate exogenously increases, a risk-averse firm will raise
FDI (see Cushman, 1988; Goldberg and Kolstad, 1994; and Campa and Goldberg, 1995) or increase for-
eign production and decrease foreign sales (see Broll, Wahl, and Zilcha, 1995). In a two-country model,
Aizenman (1992) finds that under fixed exchange rates, both domestic investment and foreign direct
investment are higher than under flexible exchange rates.
5For a description of how these linkages shape economic geography, see Krugman (1991).
6We leave out some of the features of the Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) model. For our purposes, it
is unnecessary to replicate their endogenous wage setting, to employ differentiated labor supply, or to
introduce work in the utility function.Consider a world composed of two countries (1 and 2) that are inhabited by
an equal number of agents (L) and produce two types of goods (A and B). Each
good is produced in n differentiated varieties (indexed by i = 1, ...,   n for good
A and by j = 1, ...,   n for good B) worldwide, each variety being manufactured
by a different firm. The only factor of production—labor—is homogenous,
immobile across countries, and mobile across industries (this last assumption is
not essential).
The two countries have a mirror-image production structure: a share η of the
n firms in industry A are located in country 1, and an identical share η of the n
firms in industry B are located in country 2. Without loss of generality, we assume
1⁄2 < η <1, so that country 1 (country 2) is relatively specialized in good A (good
B). A sector is defined as the part of an industry located in one country; hence,
there are four sectors: A1, A2, B1, and B2. The parameter η may be thought of as
capturing trade-theoretical reasons for a given specialization pattern.7
Uncertainty, Timing of Actions, Price Setting, and Monetary Rule
The formal analysis focuses on uncertainty arising from demand shocks. Monetary,
productivity, and exchange rate shocks are discussed in the second subsection of
Section II.
Before the resolution of uncertainty, workers of each country set the domestic
wage (wk, with k = 1,2) and commit to supply as much labor as demanded by firms
at this wage level. Firms observe the wage and choose optimal prices as markup
over expected marginal costs. Because the wage and the associated employment
in the absence of shocks are not relevant to our analysis (what matters are the fluc-
tuations around the initial equilibrium), we assume that in the absence of shocks
the wage chosen would ensure full employment (i.e., every worker would supply
one unit of labor).8
After the resolution of uncertainty, a new equilibrium in the goods and money
markets is reached: taking wages and prices as given, consumers choose optimal
consumption and money balances, and firms choose optimal employment levels.
Monetary authorities do not pursue discretionary policies. When shocks occur in
a flexible exchange rate regime, monetary authorities abstain from intervention
and let the exchange rate adjust the money market and the trade balance. When
shocks occur in a fixed exchange rate regime, authorities are committed to eliminate
any pressure on the exchange rate by adjusting money supply in order to equilibrate
the money market (trade may be unbalanced).9
7This mirror-image location of firms could be derived endogenously by introducing a comparative
advantage or factor specificity. A previous draft of this paper allowed for a Ricardian comparative advan-
tage in a new trade theory setup, as in Ricci (1997c, 1999), but the resulting mathematical complication
obscured the intuition and required simulations to present qualitatively identical results.
8Menu costs or costs in the price-setting decision process may be the reason wages and prices are not
adjusted once shocks are known. Nominal rigidities are quite common in recent international macroeco-
nomics (see Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000).
9It is irrelevant to our results whether the fixed exchange rate regime is managed symmetrically or
asymmetrically. We solve the model for the symmetric case.




All individuals share the same utility function. A representative consumer of
country k chooses nominal money balances (mk) and consumption of varieties of
goods A and B (ciAk and cjBk, respectively) so as to maximize the following ran-
dom preferences:
with
where Pk is the true price index of consumption in country k, σ is the elasticity of
substitution among varieties of the same good, and γ is the random share of expen-
diture on good A, whose mean value is 0.5 and whose percentage change (µ = dγ/γ)
is bounded in (−Ω, Ω) with mean 0 and variance u2.
The nominal wealth of a representative individual of country k (qk) is the sum
of income (yk) and endowment of domestic currency (m
s
k). Each individual sup-
plies labor to domestic firms at the given wage and receives profits from these
firms; individual income is, therefore, a share 1/L of domestic firms’ revenues.
Individual endowment of money is a fraction 1/L of the domestic stock of money,
which may vary under fixed exchange rates because of monetary intervention. The
consumer’s budget constraint is:
where pk
iAand pk
jB are the prices of variety i of good A and of variety j of good B,
measured in the currency of the consumer’s country k.
Aggregate demands of country k for money (Md
k) and for each variety of good
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1 1 01 ,, << 1 , 0 <<1, 2 21 ,( )where Qk is the aggregate wealth of country k, PAk is true price index of good A
in country k, e is the exchange rate defined as units of the currency of country 1
for one unit of the currency of country 2 (and is equal to 1 under a fixed exchange
rate regime), and nck is the number of varieties of good c (c = A, B) produced in
country k.
Firms’ Maximization Problem
The market structure is the usual large group monopolistic competition based on
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and often adopted in trade theory thereafter (see Helpman
and Krugman, 1985). There is no free entry; endogenizing the number of firms
would not alter the results.
Production functions are identical for all firms and exhibit diminishing returns
to labor. The output (xck) of a typical firm producing a variety of good c (c = A,B)
in location k (k = 1,2) is given by xck = lα
ck, where lck is the employment of such a
firm. We assume for simplicity that α=0.5; this assumption is not essential as
long as 0<α<1.
Before the resolution of uncertainty, a typical firm of sector ck takes the wage
and other firms’ behavior as given and chooses its price (pck in its domestic cur-
rency) to maximize expected profits (πck)10:
where E is the expectation operator and xd
ck is the demand for one variety of good
c produced in k:
The profit-maximizing price (pck) for good c produced by a typical firm of
country k is therefore set as a markup over expected marginal cost:
where σ approximates, for n large enough, the perceived elasticity of demand.
After the resolution of uncertainty, firms choose optimal employment. As
prices and wages are now given, the profit function is rising in output (around the
initial equilibrium) and firms will find it optimal to satisfy demand, thus bringing
the goods market into equilibrium (xd
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10Producer currency pricing is the prevailing assumption in recent open economy literature. Alterna-
tively, some authors have focused on the pricing-to-market assumption (for example, Faruqee, 1995; and
Betts and Devereux, 2000). See Obstfeld and Rogoff (2000) for a summary of the arguments against the
pricing-to-market assumption.
11Firms would not find it optimal to satisfy very large increases in demand, since marginal cost would
rise above price. We rule out this possibility by assuming that the shocks are opportunely bounded, so that
the qualitative outcome of a comparative statics exercise would correspond to the outcome of a simulation
exploiting the full nonlinearities of the model.
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in output, implying that firms dislike variability in sales. On any given variety, the
law of one price applies.
Equilibrium in the Absence of Shocks
In the absence of shocks, the only difference between the two countries is given
by their symmetric pattern of specialization (η). Wages are set at the same level
(w) in both countries. Because all firms face an identical wage and a marginal cost
function, which is linear in output, they all choose the same price, which can be
normalized to 1 (pck = p = 1, with c = A,B; k = 1,2). Prices being equal, an identi-
cal share of expenditure will be allocated to each variety. All firms have identical
employment, output, and profits. Both countries have the same aggregate income
and wealth, and every consumer demands all varieties in the same amount. After
normalizing the exchange rate and the price of each variety to 1, we obtain the fol-
lowing (where MWR is the equilibrium world real stock of money):
II. Uncertainty and Equilibrium Location
In this section, we investigate the equilibrium distribution of firms that occurs if
firms are allowed to choose location before any other action takes place. To this
purpose, for each exchange rate regime, we first study how shocks affect firms’
sales and expected profits in each sector for a given location structure (η). We then
compare firms’expected profits within the same industry across locations and dis-
cuss the equilibrium location structure. The exercise is based on comparative stat-
ics calculations.
Equilibrium Location Pattern
To discuss the effect of demand shocks under a fixed exchange rate regime, we
assume a given location distribution (η). Given the assumptions outlined in
Section I, before the occurrence of shocks, the economy is described by the set of
relations discussed in the last subsection of Section I. Under fixed exchange rates,
any demand shock (µ) gives rise only to a direct demand effect deriving from the
change in preferences. While the money market is equilibrated by the intervention
of monetary authorities, the new goods market equilibrium is:
where Xck = dxck/xck. Considering the distribution of shocks, ex ante all firms face
the same variability of output and the same expected profits independently of their
location:
Ex w E x X w x u ck ck ππ [] =− + () [] =− 18
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x.( )with x and π defined in the final subsection of Section I. Hence, firms are indif-
ferent to location. We can thus state the following:
Proposition 1. Under a fixed exchange rate regime, any distribution of
firms is an equilibrium location pattern.
More generally, if η were to be endogenously determined, say, via factors such
as comparative advantage or location theory, a fixed exchange rate regime would
not induce a deviation from such an equilibrium allocation of resources.
Under flexible rates, the exchange rate would react to balance trade. Following
any demand shock, the direct demand effect is accompanied by the substitution
effect owing to the exchange rate adjustment, which affects firms differently
according to their industry and location. For example, an increase in demand for
good A would tend to improve the trade balance of country 1 (which is specialized
in A) and to deteriorate the balance of country 2, thus prompting an appreciation
of the currency of country 1. This would, in turn, generate a substitution effect
away from all goods produced by country 1 and in favor of those produced by
country 2. Such a substitution effect would dampen the initial shock for firms pro-
ducing A in country 1 (or B in country 2), but it would exacerbate the shock for
firms producing B in country 1 (or A in country 2). More generally, the possibility
of shocks would induce firms to anticipate a lower variability in sales in the loca-
tion where they would be part of the net exporting sector. Since firms dislike vari-
ability in sales, they would prefer such a location. Formally, the goods and money
market equilibria require
with
where the change in the exchange rate ensures trade balance, which reflects
changes in sales in the four different sectors. By confronting the coefficients 
gckD, we can derive that firms located in the country relatively specialized in their
industry (i.e., firms producing varieties of A in country 1 or of B in country 2)
face a lower variability in sales and higher expected profits than firms of the 
same industry located in the other country (i.e., producing A in country 2 or B in
country 1):
The difference in expected profits across locations for the same industry
increases with the degree of specialization (η) and with the variance of the shocks
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(u2). Because firms enjoy higher expected profits if they are located in the coun-
try relatively specialized in the good they produce, countries are fully specialized
in equilibrium. We can thus state the following:
Proposition 2. Under a flexible exchange rate regime, firms have an
incentive to locate in the country that is relatively specialized in the good
they produce. In the absence of any other location incentive (such as
comparative advantage), the equilibrium location pattern is given by full
specialization.
The extreme specialization under flexible rates is obviously due to the exoge-
nous nature of the initial distribution of firms (η).12 More generally, when other
trade or location incentives for specialization are present, the equilibrium location
pattern would be derived by weighing, for the marginal firm: (1) the incentive to
locate in the country that is relatively specialized in the good the firm produces, in
order to benefit from the adjustment role of the exchange rate; and (2) the effi-
ciency loss associated with the departure from the location choice dictated by the
comparative advantage or other location incentives. As a result, countries would
be more specialized under flexible than under fixed exchange rates.
Other Sources of Uncertainty
In this section we argue that similar location incentives arise from monetary,
exchange rate, and productivity shocks.13
Monetary and exchange rate shocks
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, any change in money stock is reflected in an
equal change in expenditure on both goods, independently of the country in which
the shock originated. All firms experience the same change in sales; hence, the
same variability in sales and the same expected profits. Any distribution of firms
is an equilibrium.
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the exchange rate movements associ-
ated with monetary and exchange rate shocks induce expenditure shifts across
countries. Each firm located in the country that has the largest market share of 
the good that the firm produces will bear a smaller share of the expenditure shift
than its foreign competitors. Such a firm would therefore face a lower variability
in sales and higher expected profits. To the extent that countries are net exporters
of the good of which they have the largest market share, under flexible rates,
firms would have an incentive to locate in the country relatively specialized in the
12The results would apply also in the presence of endogenous monetary policy, as long as such a pol-
icy would not find it optimal to fully counteract shocks.
13For a formal analysis of these shocks, see the Working Paper version of this paper (Ricci, 1997a). 
In all cases but one (exchange rate shocks), the exchange rate is an endogenous variable.good they produce, and the only equilibrium location pattern would be full 
specialization.14
Supply shocks
Supply shocks are very similar to demand shocks, once we allow for an automatic
response of monetary policy. In the presence of price rigidities, it is reasonable to
assume that monetary authorities adjust domestic money supply in the same direc-
tion as the change in average domestic productivity, to accommodate changes in
expenditure and reduce employment fluctuations. For simplicity, consider the case
in which money is adjusted at the same rate as productivity.
Under a fixed exchange rate regime, the monetary accommodation allows
expenditure on all goods to change by the world average productivity growth. All
firms face the same variability in sales, and any location pattern is an equilibrium.
Under a flexible exchange rate regime, the country whose average productiv-
ity rises relative to that of the other country experiences a depreciation of its cur-
rency. The consequent substitution effect eases the adjustment of firms located in
the country relatively specialized in the good they produce and constitutes an ele-
ment of further disturbance for the other firms. Firms located in the country rela-
tively specialized in their industry experience a lower variability in sales and
higher expected profits. The equilibrium location of firms is full specialization.
Also for monetary, exchange rate, and productivity shocks, the presence of
comparative advantage or other location incentives would imply that specialization
under flexible rates would not be full but would be higher than under fixed rates.
III. Conclusions
This paper shows that fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes are associated with
different location incentives when demand, supply, monetary, and exchange rate
shocks arise in the presence of short-run price rigidities. Countries tend be more
specialized under flexible exchange rates than under fixed exchange rates. In fact,
when real shocks occur, flexible exchange rates provide a partial adjustment to the
firms located in the country whose aggregate shocks to net exports are positively
correlated with the firm’s shocks and generate further disturbance to the other
firms. This effect does not occur under fixed rates. A similar intuition would apply
to the cases of monetary and exchange rate shocks.
Our findings imply that the pattern of specialization suggested by any trade
model is not unique but depends on the exchange rate regime. If one considers
that firms’ location choices are normally influenced by factors such as compara-
tive advantage, economic geography, and so on, our model would suggest that
under fixed exchange rates the equilibrium location distribution would be dic-
tated by only those factors. Under flexible exchange rates, however, additional
location incentives would arise: the equilibrium location pattern would need to be
14In a setup with nonsymmetric countries, there would also be agglomeration effects (see Ricci, 1998).
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derived by weighing, for the marginal firm, the incentive to locate in the country
that is relatively specialized in the good the firm produces and the efficiency loss
associated with the departure from the location dictated by trade and geography
factors.
This paper provides a theoretical argument for the endogeneity of the opti-
mum currency area (OCA) criterion; that is, the net benefits that can be expected
from a currency area increase with the creation of the currency area, because this
reduces international specialization and the asymmetry of shocks across candidate
countries.15 This would suggest that the creation of the European Monetary Union
could induce a relocation of economic activity that would make countries more
similar and shocks more symmetric.
This paper also offers two explanations for the puzzle related to the effects of
exchange rate variability on trade. Whereas most theoretical analyses (based on
partial equilibrium models) suggest a negative effect, most empirical studies found
no effect or a small negative one (see, for example, Gagnon, 1993; Dell’Ariccia,
1999; and Clark and others, 2004). First, a partial equilibrium analysis may over-
state the negative effect of the exchange rate variability, as it fails to recognize that
such variability is partly an endogenous response to shocks. Second, under flex-
ible rates, economic uncertainty (whether in fundamentals or in the exchange rate
itself) unevenly affects firms in different industries, suggesting that a small impact
at the aggregate level may hide large differences at the industrial level.
The model has been kept simple to avoid unnecessary mathematical compli-
cation and to highlight the intuition; however, we believe that our results would
hold qualitatively under more general assumptions or in a more complicated setup.
For example, one could extend the setup to a multiperiod framework (as long as
in every period some shocks arise after prices are optimally chosen); introduce
financial assets (as long as contingent claims markets are incomplete); consider
that firms maximize expected utility from profits (as long as international equity
markets are imperfect);16 relax price rigidities (as long as firms dislike variability
in sales, the result would hold for demand and monetary shocks);17 allow for for-
eign direct investment (the location incentives we described would apply to both
the main firm and its foreign subsidiaries); endogenously derive the number of
firms in each industry (by allowing for free entry and introducing a fixed produc-
tion cost); consider firms’ relocation choices (the overall effect would depend on
the extent of relocation costs versus the difference in expected operating profits
15See Bayoumi (1994) and Ricci (1997b) for models of the net benefits of a currency area. For sur-
veys of the OCA literature, see de Grauwe (1992), Masson and Taylor (1992), and Tavlas (1994). Frankel
and Rose (1998) argued the endogeneity of the OCA criterion on the basis of an empirical analysis, and
refer to the mechanism described in this paper (or Ricci, 1997a) for the support of a formal model.
16In this case, however, prices would be set differently across sectors (as expected utility from profits
is not linear in sales), and the model would need to be solved via simulations.
17Firms may dislike variability in sales for additional reasons such as the cost of firing workers,
bankruptcy costs, and the cost of maintaining stocks of goods in order to smooth periods of excess demand.
Moreover, firms would behave in a risk-averse manner if the owners are risk-averse and face incomplete
financial markets or if managers are risk-averse and face an imperfect labor market or get nonmarketable
payoffs (such as satisfaction or reputation).across locations); or allow for probabilistic creation and destruction of firms, to
analyze the effect of changes in regimes. All these interesting extensions are pos-
sibilities for future studies.
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